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ABSTRACT 
 
This research shows the impact of credit rating change (thereafter CRC) announcements on 
the combined entities following mergers and acquisitions. In looking at the effect of CRC 
announcements on share prices, we measure the level of influence that a credit upgrade or 
downgrade has on the equity value of firms.  Existing literature disputes the applicability of 
share price as a measure of value creation, preferring instead to measure effects on company 
fundamentals. By complimenting the research with impacts of CRC announcements on 
operational performance, this study also considers the level of economic value creation in 
firms post-M&A.  We present evidence of statistically insignificant negative abnormal 
returns with downgrade announcements and insignificant positive abnormal returns to 
upgrade announcements. In addition, this thesis finds statistically significant negative 
abnormal long-term operating performance for downgrades, and less significant effects for 
upgrades. Comparing the findings to previous literature on either M&A or CRC 
announcements, the research discovers proportional result between abnormal equity returns 
and abnormal performance, thus the efficient market hypothesis applies. A small sample size 
is the primary limitation, and therefore future research is recommended.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and 
overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained 
earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis.  Their 
marvellous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, 
camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation…” 
 
Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 1984 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have experienced continued growth in the market for 
corporate control, as well as in research. What was once an idiosyncrasy of the 
North American market has expanded over the past two decades into 
international business stardom among pundits and academics (Bertrand & 
Zuniga, 2006; Bruner, 2002; Zollo & Meier, 2008). A good example has been the 
European market, which, at the beginning of the new millennium, has been a 
source of tremendous intensification in both volume and frequency of M&A 
transactions, presumably from a new economic structure and development of the 
European Union (Gaughan, 2007).  Strong growth in M&A deals throughout 
Europe has been seen over the past 10 years, barring the 2008 financial crisis 
(Appendix 1).  Sustained M&A growth is to be expected, due to the recent 
implementation of quantitative easing by the European Central Bank (Financial 
Times, 2015)- the result of which should inflate share prices and provide easier 
access to capital for purchases (Di Giovanni, 2005).  As the field evolves in terms 
of experience and technology, an incremental use of new rules, methods and 
motives, created with the intention of considering the mistakes of prior deals as 
	   5	  
well as the economic and financial conditions. Yet, the ongoing debate between 
the conventional wisdom that most acquisitions destroy value or whether it is 
actually value creating is far to be over. Reading the available literature, it is 
frequent to encounter inconsistent results (Asquith, Bruner & Mullins, 1983; 
Berger & Ofek, 1995; Healy, Palepu & Ruback, 1992; Meeks, 1977; Mueller, 1980; 
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). It is also recurrent to come across CEOs’ 
announcements in which are explained and estimated potential synergies that in 
most of the cases appear artistically conceived (Mendenhall, 2005). What they all 
have in common is the absence of a central element that makes M&A a more 
exact science, a component that is clear and understandable, that it is easy to 
present to shareholders and the market, one that it is hard to question and 
accessible to everyone. As a possible solution, this thesis presents the role of 
credit rating agencies (thereafter CRAs) and their credit assessment as a potential 
signal device for M&A’ success. 
 
1.2 Purpose of this Research 
 
This thesis evaluates the effect of credit rating change (thereafter CRC) 
announcements on firm value post-M&A completion, with a geographical 
delimitation of European acquirers.  Abnormal shareholder returns are analyzed, 
and used as indicators of the market reaction to CRC announcements.  Long-
term operating performance is measured using accounting ratios before and after 
the announcement dates.    The results of these tests are subsequently used to 
make conclusions about the level of importance that is currently placed, and should 
be placed, on credit rating change announcements. 
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The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
 
H1: A credit rating upgrade following a merger or an acquisition generates an abnormal positive 
return on the stock price and vice versa, as a result of information signaling. 
 
H2: Firms that received an upgrade on credit rating following a merger or an acquisition 
experience incremental operating performances in the long-term and the opposite for those 
downgraded. 
 
By testing these hypotheses, this thesis aims to provide shareholders and 
management with clarifying elements about M&As. Firstly, is the goal of 
providing shareholders with a reliable information signal in order to mitigate 
effects of information asymmetry, explained later.  Secondly, this study aims to 
support the M&A decision-making process by management, by proposing CRC 
announcements as a source of unbiased value signaling. 
Previous studies focus on the impact of M&A announcements on equity value 
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller, 2002; Grinblatt & Titman, 
2002) or operating performance (Healy et al, 1992; Lubatkin, 1987). However, the 
existing literature appears to have ignored the importance placed by shareholders 
on impartial analysis such as credit rating agencies after M&A deals. Studies on 
measures of effectiveness of mergers and acquisitions are inconclusive (Bauer & 
Matzler, 2014; Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and often contradictory (Mulherin & 
Boone, 2000; Jensen, 1988).  Bearing in mind agency costs of managerial 
incentives and information asymmetry (Ogden, 2003), we challenge the current 
level of information available to shareholders and management, and call for 
greater emphasis to be placed on CRC announcements post-M&A. 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 presents the background aims 
and purpose of the study, and how the research will be approached.  Chapter 2 
begins with a case study of Royal Dutch Shell’s purchase of BG Group, and then 
discusses existing motivations of M&A deals and previous empirical studies.  
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, including the research approach, design, and 
analysis.  Chapter 4 discusses results further, and how it fits into the overall body 
of literature.  Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing this thesis project’s limitations 
and suggestions for future research.   
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2. RELEVANT THEORY AND LITERATURE 
 
This Chapter begins by presenting the case of Royal Dutch Shell’s purchase of 
BG Group.  Subsequent sections on relevant theory and literature will be tied to 
this case study for better understanding.  The chapter is divided into two sources 
of relevant literature: theoretical and empirical.  We begin with a discussion of 
theoretical literature, focusing on commonly cited motivations for management 
to engage in M&A deals.  Certain theories are also helpful to understand in the 
context of our research, and will be explained briefly.  In the second component, 
empirical research is analyzed.  Together, these will provide sufficient background 
information in order to understand the focus of this study.  
 
2.1 Case Study: Royal Dutch Shell 
 
On April 8th 2015, Royal Dutch Shell announced its acquisition of rival BG 
Group for $70 Billion in cash, which would create Europe’s largest oil and gas 
company (Bloomberg, 2015).  According to Bloomberg (2015), the transaction 
included a 50% premium, which has been justified with reasons of synergies and 
gains from momentum. It is also important to mention that both companies have 
a good degree of business relatedness, yet some operational differences: Royal 
Dutch Shell’s core business is focused on oil, while BG specializes in gas 
(Bloomberg, 2015). Shell’s CEO Ben Van Beurden promptly discussed the 
company’s acquisition on Bloomberg (2015) where he highlighted:  
• Cost reduction from economy of scale and scope due to new assets 
deployment. 
• Efficiency enhancement trough the use of Shell’s technology and 
intangible capabilities. 
• Diversification into the gas industry, hence broadening the company’s 
products.  
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• Elimination of competitor from the market. 
• BG’s assets undervaluation because of current low oil price. 
 
According to Bloomberg (2015), stakeholders however, were less welcoming of 
the acquisition.  The share price experienced a large drop, while analysts doubted 
the level of compatibility with BG’s Brazilian operations.  Soon after, Moody’s 
placed a negative outlook on the company’s credit rating (Bloomberg, 2015).  
Motivations for engaging in M&A transactions manifest in different forms. 
Hubris, disturbance theory, synergies, and diversification are among the most 
evident in this case, and will be explained further in the literature review.   
 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
 
Using the reputed author of corporate finance, Joseph Ogden, as a basis for 
theoretical discussion, this section provides a necessary background of 
management theory.  This will provide insight into the most commonly cited 
motivations for embarking on M&A deals.  At the core of relationships within a 
publicly held organization is asymmetrical information between shareholders and 
management (Ogden, 2003).  Management has a better understanding of the 
firm’s true value and prospects for future success, while shareholders must rely 
on their own ability to monitor the firm.  Especially in cases of diffuse ownership, 
the reality of a shareholder’s understanding of the firm is dependent on opinions 
from management or other indicators (Tricker, 2012).  The sensitive nature of a 
firm’s trade secrets leads us to believe that the lack of information provided to 
shareholders will remain unchanged (Healy et al., 1992). Akerlof’s studies (1970) 
provide examples of how information asymmetry can manifest (Akerlof, 1970).  
In the same way that his research on the market for used automobiles exemplifies 
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the potentially hazardous buy/sell decisions being made, we draw the parallel to 
shareholders and managers in the role of an acquirer in M&A deals.  In situations 
where shareholders lack information, or managers are confined by bounded 
rationality, a signal is helpful to avoid pooling equilibrium and adverse selection 
(Spence, 1973). We agree with Spence’s recommendation for a signal that cannot 
easily be mimicked by lemon firms, and posit that a CRA could fill this role.  This 
research therefore tests the degree to which shareholders do and should base 
investment decisions on the advice of CRAs when assessing an M&A deal.  
Building upon the research of Spence (1973), a series of studies have likened such 
signals to information transfer mechanisms, whereby shareholders and 
management have a more equal level of knowledge, as opposed to the existing 
asymmetry (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Riley, 1979; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).   
 
Before looking at the motivations behind M&As, it is useful to understand the 
incentives of both management and shareholders.  According to Ogden (2003), 
management has two sources of self-interest: an inherent goal of increasing their 
compensation, and decreasing the riskiness of their compensation (Ogden, 2003).  
Firstly, the goal of increasing compensation is seen through management’s 
incentives to maximize the size of the firm, rather than its value (Ogden, 2003).  
Secondly, is management’s self-interest in reducing the risk of their 
compensation, through excessive diversification, bias towards investments with 
short-term payoffs, and entrenchment (Ogden, 2003). 
Shareholders by contrast, are incentivized by greater returns, which are realized 
through riskier investments.  As the principal participant in their relation with 
firms, they employ management as their agent, to maximize the market value of 
the firm’s equity (Ogden, 2003).  The self-interests of both parties help explain 
the recurrence of many motivations, as summarized in (Appendix 2) and 
explained further next. 
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The case of Royal Dutch Shell exemplifies some common managerial motivations 
for seeking M&A deals, which we explain further next.  The acquiring firm’s 
justification for a 50% purchase premium stems from a variety of motivations.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, we draw on several theories: a) Synergies 
b) Disturbance Theory c) Diversification and elements of d) Hubris.  Although 
there are numerous other motivations for M&As, these four are highlighted due 
to their prominence in the case, and the applicability across numerous other 
M&A transactions. 
Synergies refer to the merged entities having a greater value than the sum of its 
parts (Gaughan, 2007).  In this case, Royal Dutch Shell CEO Ben Van Beurden 
justifies the choice of premium paid for BG, by citing the greater combined 
effects of the two firms upon completion.  Synergies are often divided into 
operating (e.g. revenue enhancement, cost reduction) and financial (e.g. lower 
cost of capital) such that 1 + 1 = 3 (Gaughan, 2007).  Disturbance Theory 
(Trautwein, 1990) attributes the decision of merging or acquiring, to economic 
disturbances that demand change by firms.  Royal Dutch Shell has justified the 
timing of their purchase with the shock in oil prices, which had dropped to a low 
of $50/barrel at the time the deal was covered by media (Financial Times, 2015), 
which caused a reorganization of the entire industry and therefore demands 
actions by firms to remain competitive (Trautwein, 1990).  Diversification 
(Gaughan, 2007) is explicit in Van Beurden’s motives, who posits that shifting 
Shell’s focus from oil to natural gas will help future value creation.  Finally, hubris 
(Ogden, 2003) is seen implicitly in Shell’s case, as Van Beurden has shared his full 
confidence in the ability of his firm to fully capitalize on synergies and economic 
shocks to justify a seemingly overconfident bid premium (Bloomberg, 2015). 
Two categories of motivations start to emerge in the example of Royal Dutch 
Shell, which we also believe are apparent in many M&A transactions.  Firstly, the 
presence of managerial incentives is evident.  Whether through excessive 
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diversification or hubris, motivations stemming from management desires to 
increase personal compensation while reducing riskiness of their compensation 
manifest in theory (Ogden, 2003) and in practice (Bloomberg 2015).  If readers 
agree that the responsibility is too onerous for shareholders to decipher 
management’s true intentions with an M&A deal, (s)he will find relevance in this 
study’s assessment of CRC announcements as signals of value 
creation/destruction.  Synergies are the second common trend motives for 
M&As.  As explained in detail later, empirical studies on the synergistic effects of 
M&As are inconclusive (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  
Relevance of this study will again be apparent if readers consider that synergistic 
effects are too difficult for management to accurately predict upon entering into 
M&A agreement.  This notion is supported by the Process Theory, whereby 
management is confined by bounded rationality and decision-making (Trautwein, 
1990). 
Researchers posed a valuable question in the study by Brouthers, Van 
Hastenburg, Van den Ven (1998): If Most Mergers Fail, Why are they so Popular?  
In concluding this theoretical review, the authors support the Process Theory 
(Trautwein, 1990) and Hubris (Ogden, 2003) motivations for M&As, as they 
appear to account for much of the contrasting evidence for M&A success factors.  
This is further supported by the fact that while target firm shareholders receive a 
premium of between 8% and 20.2% % (Jensen, 1988; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; 
Bagchi & Rao, 1992), those of the acquiring firm have been shown to receive 
substantially less, with returns between 0-6.5% (Jensen, 1988; Bagchi & Rao, 
1992). 
2.3 Empirical Research 
 
The empirical literature on the stock returns and operational performance of 
acquirer firms in M&A deals is discussed in this section, in order draw 
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comparisons and contrasts with theoretical knowledge, and build the foundational 
knowledge for this thesis project’s research.  
With M&A deals having become increasingly common in the market for 
corporate control, an abundance of literature has focused on the extent to which 
shareholders of acquiring and target firms benefit (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Fuller 
et al., 2002; Grinblatt & Titman, 2002;	  Healy et al., 1992; Lubatkin, 1987).  Studies 
have provided convincing research on the effects of pre- and post-M&A factors 
for success.  It appears that most studies have concluded greater benefits for 
target firm shareholders than acquirer (Jensen, 1988; Lubatkin, 1983; Mulherin & 
Boone, 2000).  A number of other factors have shown varying impacts on M&A 
effectiveness, such as the degree of relatedness between acquirer and target firms 
(Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Matsusaka, 1993), relative target firm size (Bagchi & 
Rao, 1992; Bauer & Matzler, 2014), and degree of complementarity (Bauer & 
Matzler, 2014; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Harrison, 2001).  Literature has provided 
support for both organizational factors such as the ability to integrate and spread 
tacit knowledge (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Birkinshaw, Bresmaz & Hatakson, 2000; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) and financial factors such as lower tax payments, 
broken contracts with managers, and mistakes in valuation by inefficient capital 
markets (Jensen, 1988) as contributors to post-M&A success.	  
Testing the effects of these variables on M&A success is usually conducted 
through regression analysis (Fuller et al., 2002) or event studies in order to 
measure any change in abnormal returns (AR) or cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) on the acquiring firm’s share price (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002;	  Healy et al., 
1983; Lubatkin, 1987). For example, although the stock return at the time of 
announcement cannot solely be attributed to the expected effect of the 
acquisition on profitability (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002), evidences suggest that 
acquiring shareholders earn, on average, a zero abnormal return at the 
acquisition's announcement (Fuller et al.; 2002). Other studies analyze operational 
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performance through measures like return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) (Mueller, 1980), or operating cash flow (Healy et al., 1992) due to what 
they believe is a better indicator of economic gains. In this case, previous 
researched are even more contrasting. The study from the last mentioned authors 
(Healy et al., 1992) dates back to the 1980’s and found evidence of M&A 
operational value creation in USA. More recent but less reliable source (Gmelich, 
2011), reports significant negative abnormal performance on the long run in 
USA, and slightly positive for European firms. Recent literature from Bauer & 
Matzler (2014) acknowledge the fragmented research and often opposing 
evidence on M&As, and propose a holistic approach to better understand the 
interdependencies of M&A success factors (Bauer & Matzler, 2014).  This thesis 
helps provide closure on M&A success indicators, by looking at the impact of 
CRC announcements on the share price and operational performance of firms 
post-M&A. This will be explained further in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Role of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
To understand the relation between M&A and ratings it is a priority to appreciate 
the key features of credit rating. In this section, we first present a descriptive 
outlook of credit agencies while considering how M&A activities influence their 
pronouncements. Then we explain ratings’ role and their usefulness in the 
financial market. Then, we clarify the meeting point where credit rating 
encounters corporate structure decisions.  After that, with the support of the 
Royal Dutch Shell case, we evaluate a new, implicit function of credit agencies 
that, through the media, appear to be protagonists of corporate transactions’ 
opinions and verdicts directly related to M&A’s motives. Lastly, we have an 
insight of previous studies in regards to the power of rating changes on 
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companies’ stock price; this will be also used in the analysis of our result to assess 
the congruence with existing literature. 
 
2.4.1 Credit ratings and their impact on finance 
 
One of the main indicators of corporate quality is the rating assigned to the 
corporation as well as its outstanding by independent credit agencies (Altman, 
1998).  Credit agencies are private institutions that assess the prospect of a credit 
default, defined as the miss or late reimbursement of debt interest o principal 
(Moody’s Investor Service, 2015a). We argue that credit agencies are officially 
only commentators and they are not legally liable for their credit assessment as 
was pointed out by The Financial Crisis Inquiry report (2011). Credit agencies’ main 
revenue streams come from rating fees paid by the rated firm (Kruck, 2011). In 
less common cases, according to Kruck (2011), they produce ratings from their 
own initiative. Among the various types of rating, this thesis considers the 
difference of issuer rating rather than the issue rating together with the long-term 
view rating rather than short-term rating.  In order to measure the 
creditworthiness of firms, credit agencies uses both qualitative and quantitative 
criteria for risk measurement including (1) Political and Country risk, (2) Industry 
risk, (3) Company-Specific Business Risk, (4) the Management factor and (5) the 
Financial risk (Gauguin & Bilardello, 2005). M&A activities imply a high degree 
of influence on the measurement of risks, resulting on key events for credit rating 
change: 
1. Political and Country risk is affected by cross–border acquisitions  
(Allee, Mansi & Reeb, 2001)  
2. Acquisitions that aim for diversification reduce the industry and 
business cycle risk (coinsurance hypothesis) 
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3. Acquisitions decrease the Business Risk by increasing the size of the 
firm (Ammann & Verhofen, 2006) 
4. Good practices in corporate governance guide M&As’ transactions 
and vice-versa governance is formed by these deals 
(Hall & Norburn, 1987)  
5. The financials are altered for both financial statements and the 
acquisition’s method of payment (debt, cash or stock) (Karampatsas, 
Petmezas & Travlos, 2014) 
 
As King & Sinclair (2001) state, the need for credit assessment derives from the 
disintermediation of finance that reduces the role of commercial banks as primary 
source of capital. They further point out that, in today’s economy, there is an 
evident demand for non-bank loans that miss of banks’ intermediation and so 
their credit evaluation.  This creates an information asymmetry that for reasons of 
costs requires to be faced by centralized credit assessment agencies. In this sense, 
economists agree on the fact that ratings reduce transaction costs on the lender-
borrower transaction by efficiently allocate capital (Kruck, 2011). As a result, 
credit rating has a crucial influence on a firm ability access to capital. An 
interesting study by Rauh & Sufi (2010) presents evidences that credit rating 
shapes the capital and debt structure of firms. In particular, low-rated firms tend 
to engage on multi-tiered structure consisting of bank and non-bank debt, 
different from high-rated firms that mostly employ bank debt (see Appendix 3). 
Moreover, there exist a number of researches that appreciate credit rating as a 
mean to fulfill the criteria of ideal investment (e.g. Nicolai, Schulz & Thomas, 
2010). Although many believe that credit rating is just a lagging indicator (Reuters, 
2009), others point out that credit announcements, and therefore the change in 
the above mentioned points (1 to 5) can flag a prospective positive or negative 
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trend to the market before the firm’s intrinsic firm’s profitability is altered 
(Lagner & Knyphausen-­‐‑Aufseß, 2012; Dallocchio, Hubler, Raimbourg & Salvi, 
2006). In other words, after an M&A deal, investors can anticipate a profitability 
transition because of the rating opinions.  If considering the case of Royal Dutch 
Shell, elements can be noticed that support the fact that credit agencies offer 
opinions about the credibility and feasibility of M&A’s motives. Two days after 
the acquisition of BG was announced, Moody’s decided to include RDS under 
negative outlook with the intention of examining a potential downgrade (Moody’s 
Investor Service, 2015b) thus creating doubts about the true value creation arising 
from the deal. Yet, whether these doubts generate statically significant abnormal 
returns on the stock price remain to be proven.  
2.4.2 Effects of Credit Rating Changes 
 
In the case of a traditional rating change, hence when the announcement it is not 
contaminated by a previous event such as an M&A, findings of previous 
researches appear varying.  Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich, (1992) is one of the 
most cited studies in this regard. The research accounts a total number of 1133 
rating changes (841 downgrades; 292 upgrades) during the period 1977to 1982.  
They evidence that downgrades are associated with statistically significant 
negative abnormal return on the stock price of -1.52% (t stat of -4.11) with 60.1% 
of the sample showing negative stock returns. Conversely, There is not evidence 
for significant positive abnormal return on stock price caused by upgrade 
announcements with only 0.24% returns (t test of 1.13). This analysis is also 
supported by Liu, Seyyed & Smith, (1999), explaining that whereas the market 
perceive a deterioration of wealth as signaled by the downgrade announcement, 
upgrade is perceived as “hold” advice rather than “buy”. In addition, Zaima and 
McCarthy (1988) provided a corporate theory explanation of the above results. 
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They point out that the statistically insignificant results of upgrades derive from a 
decline of the overall enterprise riskiness, which signal potential lower returns and 
the rise of agency costs of managerial incentives. Conversely, there are also 
studies (Weinstein, 1978) that argue the absence of equity reaction to credit rating 
change. Nevertheless, it has to be concluded that, although credit agencies stress 
that their ratings are merely “comments” which do not account for 
recommendations and do not signal the suitability of an investment (Moody’s 
Investor Service, 2015c), they certainly do. In the next methodology, we will 
reconsider the study of Hand et al. (1992) by adding the contamination of (pre-
event) M&A announcement and therefore answering the question: Do investors rely 
on credit opinions to evaluate the credibility of M&A’s motives?  
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                                             3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter we explain our selection of data, and choice of analysis methods, 
which have been used to test our hypotheses.  We critically analyze the validity 
and reliability of our results, in order to provide an objective summation of our 
research. 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
As Healy et al. (1992) identify, changes in equity values surrounding M&A deals 
are often attributed to an unmeasured source of economic gain, such as a synergy.  
They further posit that “the anticipation of real economic gains is observationally 
equivalent to market mispricing” (Healy et al., p.146).  It is therefore difficult to 
conceive of a pure stock price study that could resolve the ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the evidence (Healy et al., 1992).  In support of Healy et al.’s 
prognosis above, this thesis combines event studies for abnormal returns of both 
stock prices and operating ratios, in order to more fully measure economic impact 
of CRC announcements.   
 
The starting point of the research lays on the use of event studies as a central 
methodology. This is because, since 1985 when Brown and Warner introduced 
significant modifications on the event study methodology of abnormal returns, it 
has become the most common and preferred method when studying the 
consequences of an event (Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2010). This thesis explores 
two different hypotheses, which entail the use of slightly different approaches as 
well as underlying analysis.  The first evaluates the importance of a credit rating 
change preceded by a recent M&A in order to examine if any value is created or 
destroyed by the signaling of such action. Therefore the underlying in this case is 
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the firms’ stock prices and their reaction to the announcement. The second 
hypothesis seeks to estimate the enterprises’ long-term value creation in order to 
adequately shape an understanding of the relation between credit ratings and 
value creation. Therefore the underlying in this case are operating figures. The 
significance of the results is tested using the parametric t-test. 
3.2 Measuring the impact of CRC announcements on stock prices 
 
The event study approach follows that of MacKinlay (1997), which has often 
been cited in other event studies.  Credit rating change announcements are the 
event of interest, since the research purpose is to assess its impact as a signal. It is 
important to note that at the time of the credit announcement, the stock price has 
undergone abnormal changes caused by the recent acquisition (Loderer & Martin, 
1990). This also helps in capturing the tradeoff between the two signals (M&A 
completion and CRC announcement) and thereby gauges the importance from an 
investors’ point of view.  An event window of 11 days (announcement day ±5) 
has been selected in accordance with similarly conducted studies (Duso et al., 
2010) and daily data has been retrieved in order to permit the examination of 
periods surrounding the event. The study include 5 days previous the event day 
because the information relative to the credit change could have been released 
some time before from sources different from Eikon Terminal (Reuters, 2015) 
and 5 days after because the market might take some time to assimilate the signal. 
If the rating announcement has positive information content we expect above-
average market values of equity and vice versa. To find this association, all 
announcements were initially segmented by upgrade or downgrade status.  
Abnormal returns (AR) have been calculated in order to assess the event’s impact.  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) have been calculated both over time and 
across securities.  See Appendix 4 for a complete list of formulae.  To model the 
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normal return the market model is selected, which represents a potential 
improvement over the constant mean return model (MacKinlay, 1997).  Two 
categories of tests have been done, one with country-specific benchmark indices 
for each company, and one using the STOXX 600 Europe Index, which has been 
used as the most closely represented single index (STOXX, 2015).  Due to the 
international nature of the sample firms, there is no index containing the full list 
of companies, to our knowledge.  An estimation window of 250 days has been 
chosen, which is a commonly cited requirement for adequate estimation 
(Bartholdya, Olsonb & Pearec, 2007, Brown & Warner, 1985).  A visual diagram 
of the event study timeline can be seen in Appendix 5. Lastly, parametric t-tests 
have been conducted to assess the statistical significance of the results. The t-
statistic is measured against 1-tailed t-distribution because the two sample 
categories (upgrade and downgrade announcements) include less than 30 firms 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
3.3 Measuring operational performance 
  
The methodology used in this thesis to evaluate the CRC announcement’s impact 
on long-term operational performance is similar to studies by Brown & Warner 
(1985) and Barbel & Lyon (1995).  The concept of the event study is the same as 
outlined in Section 3.2.  Main differences in this test are the performance metrics 
used, and benchmark performance.  In addition, the event window has been 
modified to include the 3 fiscal years following the CRC announcement, which is 
a benchmark for measuring long-term effects (Barber & Lyon, 1995).  The same 
parametric t-test for significance has been used.  The structure of the event study 
has been organized as follows.  Firstly, is an explanation of operating measures 
selected to signify changes in firm profitability.  Secondly, a detailed overview of 
the benchmark with which to compare actual performance is provided.  Lastly, 
the statistical t-test is implemented.  The structure is explained in more detail in 
	   22	  
the next sub-sections. 
3.3.1 Determination of operating features 
Return on Assets: 
The majority of the studies from 1980 to 1990 advocate the use of earnings per 
share over price as a proxy for a firm profitability (Healy et al., 1988; Asquith, 
1989). The 1990s onwards saw a shift towards the use of operating income over 
total assets (Denis & Denis 1993, Mikkelson & Shah 1994). We believe return on 
assets (ROA) is a superior performance indicator, and has been used in this study 
for the following reasons: 
• By excluding special items such as interest expense, tax considerations and 
minority interests, ROA represents a more accurate measure of operating 
performance. 
• By determining ROA rather than EPS, changes in corporate structure 
deriving from the M&A are disregarded.  
• EPS can be skewed by changes in the number of shares outstanding, 
therefore decreasing its effectiveness. 
• Maintaining consistency with other event studies on the impact of credit 
rating announcements (Altman and Rijken, 2006). 
 
Notably, the comparison across firms has to be made on the base of the 
productivity at t = 1 deriving from operating assets at t = 1.  Accordingly, 
operating income has been divided by end of the year book value of assets (a 
proxy for market value of assets).  
 
The main drawback of ROA is originated by the combination of operating and 
non-operating assets within total assets. When accounting the book value of 
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assets, non-operational assets are included that understate the value of the ratio 
and its effectiveness on comparison. Due to the lack of available information on 
market value of assets, ROA’s accuracy is often less than perfect.  Book value of 
assets has been used in this research as a proxy.  
 
In order to overcome these issues, this thesis proposes two alternatives: 
A. Return on Assets adjusted for cash and cash equivalents  
To increase the accuracy of our results we should subtract the amount of 
all non-operating assets from the amount of total assets so that ROA is 
able to embody a clear productivity analysis of the firm. Although a full 
separation of assets is the auspicious technique, this thesis adjusts for cash 
and cash equivalents as non-operating assets. According to 
Gaughan (2007), it is fair to say that 98% of cash and cash equivalents is 
attributable to financing activities and therefore does not generate 
operating income. Also, while C&CE can invest in operating assets, the 
resulting operating income is likely to be realized in further periods.  In 
conclusion, the second performance measure will be ROA adjusted for 
cash and cash equivalents. Eventually, we expect analogues results with the 
traditional ROA. 
B. Return on Sales 
The second alternative intends to overcome both issues previously 
mentioned. By scaling operating income to sales (ROS), the weaknesses of 
using total assets are eliminated as well as it is now possible to consider 
accountancies belonging to the same financial statement and therefore of 
same format. Moreover, this ratio mitigates the fact that total assets might 
be unusually high due to the recent acquisition.  However, the disadvantage 
is that ROS does not measure the profitability of the company because the 
management can change the amount of operating assets without affecting 
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the relation between sales and income. Nevertheless, there is another 
important reason why the ROS is presented in this study. In the literature 
review we have seen that the two most cited motives for M&A are revenue 
enhancement and cost cutting, two elements that are centrally included in 
ROS. Through that, it is interesting the possibility to picture the realization 
of synergies within our sample. 
3.3.2 Determining Benchmark Performance 
 
To assess whether a firm is performing abnormally well or poor, Barber and Lyon 
(1996) suggest comparing the firm’s performance measures to a benchmark in 
order to specify the performances we would expect in the absence of the event. 
To construct the benchmark we use 3 competitors operating in the same industry 
so that industries’ performance differences are controlled (Appendix 6). In 
addition, the second main filter considers the similarity in size defined as market 
capitalization at the time previous the event (t=0). In principle we assume that 
performances vary mainly according to industry and size, assumption supported 
by the studies of Fama and French (1995), Kaplan (1989). 
We also tried to select competitors with comparable historical performance, 
hence those with a ROA deviation of max ±10% to the studied firm. Though, in 
some cases not enough companies fall into this last comparison specification and 
an enlarged filter was implemented. After the benchmark is selected, it is kept 
constant during the 3 years length and the average performance for each year is 
computed. At this point, we encounter the choice of constructing an appropriate 
level of normal performance. Barber and Lyon propose 3 alternatives: the first, 
which is not considered in this thesis, compares the sample firm with only its own 
historical performances 𝑁 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1 , in our opinion neglecting the 
competitive environment. The second alternative states that the normal 
	   25	  
performance is equal to the average comparison’s group performance [𝑁 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑡]. The main disadvantage here is that competitors that are historically more 
or less profitable due to elements different from the acquisition or the rating, 
such as specific macroeconomic variables or management ability, they might bias 
the result. Nevertheless, we try to alleviate this problem by the above-mentioned 
historical performance matching. The third alternative comes as an evolution of 
the second, aiming to mitigate its disadvantage. It includes not only the 
performance of the comparison groups, but also the firm’s own historical 
performance concluding that the normal performance is equal to its past 
performance plus the change in industry performance [𝑁 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  ∆𝑃𝐵!"]. At the beginning of our research, we applied the last alternative because 
we believed it was most the most adequate to our scope. However, the fact that 
the majority of the firms included in our sample experience the economic shock 
from the financial crisis, led us to realise that normality would be under-over 
estimated from the firms’ past own performances.  Therefore, the research finally 
turned to the second alternative that conveys the most powerful result. 
 
3.4 Data Collection Method 
 
Summary information on mergers and acquisition deals has been sourced from 
Zephyr (2005).  The name of the acquiring company, as well as the 
announcement and completion dates of the M&A deal were the desired outcomes 
from this data retrieval.  The following is an explanation of delimitations imposed 
on the Zephyr data.  The timeframe is from 01/01/2000 until 01/01/2013 for 
two main reasons.  The first motivation was that the European Union was 
formed in 1999, and we have allowed for a period of market integration before 
analyzing M&A deals.  Secondly was the desire to assess both short- and long-
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term impacts on firm value, through analysis of stock returns and performance 
multiples.  As it was previously mentioned, a commonly used benchmark of long-
term impact is 3 years, making 01/01/2013 the latest possible deal completion 
date, in order to effectively assess post-firm value since then.  Geographically, our 
data has been delimited such that: the acquirer is headquartered in the European 
Union, Western Europe, or Eastern European regions.  This decision complies 
with one of the goals of this study, which is to achieve greater relevance in the 
continent of Europe. Another requirement was for current deal status to be 
“completed”, so that post-deal effects would be analyzing a full- and not partial-
M&A effects. Likewise, the minimum percentage of the final ownership stake was 
limited to 100%, meaning that the acquiring company owned the target company 
outright. All major sectors have been included in the data, except for financials 
(banks) and other financial institutions (such as insurance companies) because 
they follow characteristics and financial regulations different from other players. 
The last requirement was that of a publicly listed acquirer, to allow for easier 
post-M&a data access and analysis.  The aforementioned filters resulted in a total 
of 20,968 deals of all sizes ($USD). 
 
Credit rating data has been compiled using Thomson Reuters Eikon software.  
The credit rating monitor service was utilized in order to find all credit changes 
within the same time period as the M&A data.  The same geographical regions 
and sectors have been selected, with the purpose of matching credit rating 
changes to acquirer companies shortly after M&A deals.  Rating types have been 
delimited to the three main CRAs (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch), focusing on Long Term 
Issuer Ratings.  The reason is based on supporting literature, which indicates that 
rating agencies rate through the cycle, focusing more on long-term debt as a 
better indicator of issuer performance/default probability, as opposed to short-
term debt instruments (Ekins, 2012).  A final sample of 31 acquirer companies 
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has been selected for event study analysis (Appendix 7).  These companies have 
met all of the above criteria, and have had credit rating changes within a 
maximum of 2 months following an M&A deal.  A summary of the data filters 
applied can be found in Table 1 below. A larger final sample could have been 
used with less stringent filters, but we believe the current sample encompasses a 
strong relation between M&A completion and CRC announcement.  
 
Table 1: Data Filtering 
Filter Description Sample  
None All deals 1,281,122 
Geography Acquirer based in European Union, Eastern 
Europe, Western Europe  
627,665 
Deal Status Completed – confirmed 456,359 
Sectors All except financials (banks) and financial 
institutions (e.g. insurance companies) 
420,738 
Ownership Stake 100% Final Ownership 168,085 
Timeframe All deals between Jan.1, 2000 and Jan.1, 2013 109,970 
Firm Structure Publicly listed acquirer 20,968 
Credit Rating 
Change 
Credit rating Upgrade or Downgrade from 
Moody’s, S&P’s, or Fitch’s Long Term Rating 
Service within 2 months of deal completion 
31 
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Often, event studies look at the effects of stocks on a single index (Brown 
and Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997).  Due to the large geographical selection in 
this study, a single index containing all 31 companies does not exist.  The 
STOXX Europe 600 however, contains 29 of the sample firms, and has been 
used as the closest alternative.  Two scenarios are tested: (1) Separate Indices and 
(2) Common Index, so that any important differences are accounted for.  
Scenarios are further subdivided into event day and event window estimates.  
Once again, an 11-day event window has been used, to account for any lag in the 
announcement date, and stock market impact.  In testing the impact on both 
stock returns and operational performance, statistical significance is analyzed 
against the null hypothesis.  In the context of this research, the null hypothesis 
states that there is no abnormal impact on stock returns or operational 
performance due to CRC announcements.  
 
4.1 Abnormal Returns of Stock Prices 
 
(A) Separate Indices 
In the first scenario, each acquiring firm’s stock is compared with the 
main country-specific index that it is listed on.  For example, Statoil 
ASA is compared with the Oslo Stock Exchange since it is a 
Norwegian company, Nestle SA is compared with the Swiss Market 
Index, and so on.  Results of this scenario indicate significant abnormal 
returns at the 99% confidence level for event day upgrades (T1), 
however no other significance for event day upgrades or downgrades in 
abnormal returns (ARs) or cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  By 
contrast, the event window averages show greater significance in the 3 
	   29	  
remaining tests: upgraded firm’s CAR (T6), downgraded firm’s AR 
(T7) and CAR (T8).  Although none of the tests in this case are 
significant at the 90% confidence level, we observe greater overall 
significance in measuring the event windows for separate indices. Since 
the null hypothesis has been only rejected once out of a possible 8 
times during this scenario, a low level of statistical significance is 
concluded.  We cannot fully conclude that CRC announcements have a 
statistically significant impact on share prices.  It would appear 
therefore, that shareholders do not currently place a high level of 
importance on these announcements.  Appendix 8 summarizes the 
significance in a chart.  
 
 
(B) Common Index 
In the second scenario, all firms are compared against the STOXX 
Europe 600, an index of small, mid, and large cap companies 
throughout 18 countries in Europe (STOXX, 2015).  We observe 
smaller abnormal returns almost unanimously in scenario two, which 
are due to smaller expected returns of the STOXX 600 in our sample.  
A similar observation can be seen, whereby all tests become more 
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significant during tests of the event window, with the exception of 
abnormal returns for event day upgrades (T9).  We acknowledge that 
there could be an outlier in the sample of upgraded firms, in our 
Limitations section 5.2.  Results show an absence of statistical 
significance for all tests, and once again suggests that shareholders do 
not base investment decisions on CRC announcements post-M&A.  
An interesting trend can be seen between the event day (T9 to T12) 
and event window (T13 to T16) subcomponents in this scenario, 
whereby the downgraded firms’ ARs and CARs increase in significance 
from 36.55% (T11) and 19.86% (T12), respectively, to 14.16% (T15) 
and 11.26% (T16), respectively.  Although we are unable to reject the 
null hypothesis here, this might suggest that shareholders are more 
prone to selling their ownership stake during the week of a CRC 
announcement.  This notion has been supported by previous studies, 
which we explain further in section 4.2.  See Appendix 9 for a graphical 
representation of these effects. 
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4.2 Abnormal Performance of Operational Measures 
  
When the sample of rating changes is analyzed to detect abnormal operational 
performances, the results are contrasting. For example, for downgrades we notice 
negative significant abnormal performance on both profitability ratios and 
improved, weaker ROS. Instead, for upgrades we observe positive insignificant 
performance for profitability ratios along with deteriorated mainly insignificant 
ROS. Table 2 (a;b) provides the information arisen from the study. In Panel A for 
downgrades, the Return on Assets shows that year 1 and 2 are the most dramatic 
in terms of profitability, with losses of 1.63% (t-test -2.20) and 2.18% and (t-test -
2.85), respectively. Year 3 stands out with only 24% to 35% from year 2 to year 3. 
In general, during the 3-years period, firms have lost in average 4.05% (t-test -
3.16) of their profitability when compared to competitors that did not embark on 
M&A activities, which caused rating change, with only 12% of them realizing 
positive cumulative amelioration. The second alternative (ROA cash adjusted) 
presents very similar results, as we anticipated before the empirical study. It 
confirms a negative trend with a vaguely improvement in year 3. Paradoxically, 
the third alternative (ROS), ratio that should proxy the realization of synergies, 
shows opposite results. Albeit insignificant or very week significance (year 3), 
firms had in average experienced more efficient income over sales. However with 
approximately 55% of them facing lower-than-benchmark performance and 
negative median in all 3 years, the majority of the firms encounter losses still. The 
reason why the increment in ROS is not complemented by similar results in 
profitability might be explained by what sometimes analysts name “quality of 
synergy”(Bloomberg, 2015). According to this opinion, the realization of 
whatever synergy does not ensure a successful acquisition. 
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Table 2a 
Mean and Median, M&A Contaminated, Abnormal and Cumulative Performance of Fundamentals for 
Sample of Firms with Rating Downgrade Announcement by Moody's, S&P and Fitch during 2000 to 2013. 
Abnormal performance is defined as actual performance minus benchmark performance. The window runs between the fiscal 
year in which the credit announcement takes place, the year after and the year after that. The Cumulative Abnormal 
performance is defined as the sum of a firm's abnormal returns. The t-statistic is given in parenthesis below the mean % 
abnormal performance. 
Panel A: Indicated Downgrades 
 
Year 
No. of 
Firms 
Mean % 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Median % 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Mean % 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Median% 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Percent of 
Abnormal 
Performance>0 
    17           
 
1 
 
-1.63% -1.40% 
  
29% 
   
(-2.20)* 
    ROA 2 
 
-2.18% -0.60% 
  
24% 
   
(-2.85) 
    
 
3 
 
-0.25% -3.61% 
  
35% 
   
(-0.30) 
    
     
-4.05% -3.61% 12% 
          (-3.16)     
  1   -1.93% -2.65%     24% 
   
(-2.28) 
    ROA cash 
adjusted 2 
 
-2.69% -1.66% 
  
24% 
   
(-2.98) 
    
 
3 
 
-0.80% -0.84% 
  
29% 
   
(-0.84) 
    
     
-5.41% -4.08% 12% 
          (-3.38)     
  1   1.39% -0.79%     41% 
   
(0.71) 
    ROS 2 
 
1.05% -1.52% 
  
41% 
   
(0.59) 
    
 
3 
 
1.63% -0.91% 
  
41% 
   
(1.21) 
    
     
4.07% -0.59% 47% 
          (0.87)     
*The t-statistic for the mean return is based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of abnormal returns. 
*The t-statistic indicates significance at 10% when > 1.740 
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Panel B indicating upgrades shows though insignificant yet positive trend of 
profitability. In year 1, we find an average surplus of 1.43% (t-stat 0.57) with a 
median of 1.14% and 64% of the sample with above-benchmark performance. 
From year 2, we notice an inversion towards loss with abnormal positive average 
performance of only 0.76% (t-test 0.32) and negative 0.72% (t-test -0.43) in year 
3, both statistically not significant. The Cumulative Abnormal Performance as 
well not significant but with positive sign 1.47% (t-stat 0.26) and 1.71% for 
average and median, respectively. The second ratio follows the traditional ROA 
and does not show any additional information. Curiously, ROS follows an 
opposite path than the one we saw for downgrades. We find average abnormal 
performance of -0.79% (t-test -0.21), -1.83% (t-test -0.77) and -2.56% (t-test -
1.52) for year 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Above all, year 3 shows the lowest point 
with actually some but weak significance. In all years and cumulative too we see 
coincidence of average and mean.  
 We conclude that a credit rating downgrade is much more powerful on 
anticipating a profitability trend than a credit rating upgrade does, partly 
contradicting Hypotheses 2. From our sample, we find evidences that a credit 
rating downgrade statistically deteriorate the profitability of a firm with signs of 
recovery on the long run, whereas although it shows a positive inclination, we 
cannot attach any value creation to upgrades. Because of the ROS, we also find 
that the realization of cost reduction or revenue enhancing synergies do not 
ensure value creation. This conclusion comes as an affirmation of previous 
studies (see chapter 2; credit rating) and therefore we support shareholders to 
perceive, with due care, a view on “sell” for downgrades and a “hold” for 
upgrades. Lastly, we tempt manager to reconsider the motives of an M&A when 
it involves a rating downgrade as well as to carefully reduce the importance of an 
upgrade as financial motive. 
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Table 2b 
Mean and Median, M&A Contaminated, Abnormal and Cumulative Performance of Fundamentals for Sample of 
Firms with Rating Upgrade Announcement by Moody's, S&P and Fitch during 2000 to 2013. 
Abnormal performance is defined as actual performance minus benchmark performance. The window runs between the fiscal year 
in which the credit announcement takes place, the year after and the year after that. The Cumulative Abnormal performance is 
defined as the sum of a firm's abnormal performance. The t-statistic is given in parenthesis below the mean % abnormal 
performance. 
Panel B: Indicated Upgrades 
 
Year 
No. of 
Firms 
Mean % 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Median % 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Mean % 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Median% 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Performance 
Percent of 
Abnormal 
Performance>0 
    14           
 
1 
 
1.43% 1.14% 
  
64% 
   
(0.57)* 
    ROA 2 
 
0.76% 0.63% 
  
57% 
   
(0.32) 
    
 
3 
 
-0.72% 0.56% 
  
57% 
   
(-0.43) 
    
     
1.47% 1.71% 57% 
          (0.26)     
  1   1.33% 1.15%     64% 
   
(0.47) 
    ROA cash 
adjusted 2 
 
1.03% 0.84% 
  
57% 
   
(0.39) 
    
 
3 
 
-0.87% 0.90% 
  
57% 
   
(-0.45) 
    
     
1.49% 3.77% 57% 
          (0.23)     
  1   -0.79% -1.60%     50% 
   
(-0.21) 
    ROS 2 
 
-1.83% -1.89% 
  
43% 
   
(-0.77) 
    
 
3 
 
-2.56% -3.50% 
  
43% 
   
(-1.52) 
    
     
-5.17% -7.92% 50% 
          (-0.77)     
*The t-statistic for the mean return is based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of abnormal returns. 
*The t-statistic indicates significance at 10% when > 1.761 
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4.3 Connecting our Findings to Literature 
 
In empirical studies referenced earlier, evidence from credit rating changes has 
shown greater significance in share price returns due to rating downgrades, than 
upgrades (Hand et al., 1992; Liu & Seyyed, 1999; Zaima & McCarthy, 1988).  As 
mentioned in the literature review, this research has analyzed the wealth 
deterioration (Liu & Seyyed, 1999), corporate theory perspectives (Zaima & 
McCarthy, 1988) and event studies (Hand et al., 1992) of CRC announcements on 
standalone firms, without the prior occurrence of a recent M&A deal.   Our tests 
on CRC announcements, which are preceded by M&A deals, show some 
common characteristics with these previous findings.  When measured against a 
common stock index, as has been done in previous studies, our results show 
greater statistical significance in both ARs and CARs for downgraded firms than 
upgraded.  There are two important caveats to note, however.  First, is that our 
similar findings only occur in tests of the average AR and CAR during the event 
window, as opposed to the event day itself.  This could indicate a time-delay 
between the CRC announcement and decision by shareholders to sell, however it 
cannot be compared to previous studies on an exact basis.  Secondly, is that none 
of our downgraded findings are statistically significant at the 90% confidence 
level, which prevents us from rejecting the null hypothesis.  Barring limitations, 
one might conclude from a comparison of this study and Hand ’s previous 
research, that shareholders place a greater emphasis on announcements of 
downgrades under normal business circumstances, than when preceded by recent 
M&A deal completion.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice the consistence between Hand’s study, this 
thesis’s findings on abnormal returns and those on abnormal performance. In 
particular, the relation between the reactions of stock price, hence the 
information conveyed by the rating change, is proportional to actual trend of 
	   36	  
long-term performance. Seems that share price incorporates and reflect all 
relevant information. In general terms, this thesis highlight that credit rating 
change, contaminated or not contaminated by other events, represent an accurate 
signal for resource allocation that when considered together with the consequent 
change in stock price, confirms the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). As 
a result, the research assesses a meaningful importance of credit rating change as 
criteria for ideal investment and successful M&A. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Results of this study have been critically analyzed and summarized.  This section 
presents concluding statements on the validity and connectedness with existing 
research, and how future research can improve the accuracy and reliability of 
results.  
5.1 Findings and Implications 
 
This research project has argued that, in the wake of contrasting theories about 
success factors of M&A transactions, more emphasis should be placed on an 
unbiased indicator.  The proposed signal- credit rating change announcements 
post-M&A, has been vetted through two event studies to analyze its impact on 
abnormal performance.  The first study has shown that, based on the largely 
insignificant abnormal stock price changes, shareholders do not currently base 
their investment decisions on the announcements of credit rating changes after an 
M&A has been completed.  The second study has shown statistical significance 
on the long-term performance of firms upon receiving a downgrade, confirming 
part of the second hypothesis (H2).  This indicates that shareholders and 
management should place more emphasis on the opinion of credit rating agency 
opinions, as downgrade announcements have been shown to correspond with 
poorer long-term performance.   
Results of this study could support the decision-making process of shareholders 
and management during the due diligence stage of an M&A proposal.  Earlier 
constraints were identified, in the form of information asymmetry, management 
self-interest, and difficulty in evaluating potential synergies.  Such inconsistent 
success throughout M&A’s rise in prominence could benefit from an unbiased 
signal as we have identified.  While the results of this study have shown some 
significance and commonalities with previous literature, a number of limitations 
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are also evident, which are explained next.  Such factors could have material 
impact on the applicability and validity of the results.  
 
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This section identifies the limitations in research design and methodology of the 
study, and provides suggestions for improvements in future research. 
 
Ø First and perhaps foremost, was the small sample size.  As outlined in Section 
3.4, the number of transactions was delimited using numerous filters, resulting 
in a final sample size of only 31 firms/transactions.  Following the example 
from MacKinlay’s event study, a minimum 30-firm sample has been deemed 
sufficiently large (MacKinlay, 1997), which also qualifies the use of normal 
distributions in hypothesis testing.  Since the 31-firm aggregate was further 
segmented into upgrades (n = 14) and downgrades (n = 17), more degrees of 
freedom were lost, which further compounded this issue.  Rigorous filters 
were applied to the list of credit rating change announcements, in order to 
coincide with a recently completed M&A transaction.  Further studies could 
increase the sample size therefore, by loosening the filter requirements.   
 
Ø This study does not look at the degree of upgrade/downgrade 
announcements, and is therefore limited in its universality.  We believe that 
future research would benefit from more closely analyzing the degree of 
abnormal firm performance based on the degree of credit rating changes.  For 
example, testing the impact of a 1-notch credit rating downgrade post-M&A 
versus a 2-notch downgrade.  
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Ø We have not analyzed the degree to which long-term performance changes 
correspond to the premium paid by the acquiring firm.  If a 50% premium is 
paid for example, management and shareholders expect this to be recovered in 
incremental operating performance.  In that respect, it is not sufficient to test 
just for any abnormally large economic benefit.  Future studies should also 
compare it to the initial premium paid in the M&A, in order to understand the 
net present value of the transaction.  
 
 
Ø As seen in both scenario 1 and 2 of Section 4.1, the statistical significance of 
upgraded firms’ ARs is the lowest (most significant) when looking at the event 
day, however increases drastically when the 11-day event window is averaged, 
while all other tests become more statistically significant.  This could suggest 
the presence of an outlier or anecdotally large return in one of the upgraded 
firms on the event day.  Future studies could benefit from regression analysis 
in order to test for significant ARs and CARs, while incorporating long returns 
to reduce the effect of outliers.  
 
 
Ø By using separate indices, large stocks can have a great influence on the 
movement of relatively small country-specific indexes.  Statoil ASA, for 
example, represents >50% of the total value of the Oslo Stock Exchange, and 
would unduly cause large corresponding changes in the index.    
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Number of M&A deals in Europe from 2005 to 2014 (Zephyr, 2015) 
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Appendix 2: Theoretical Motivations for Pursuing M&A 
 
Gaughan  Trautwein via Risberg  Ogden 
Expansion 
• Acquiring a company 
in line with the 
business or 
geographic area that 
the company might 
want to expand is an 
alternative during 
slower organic 
growth. 
 Monopoly Theory 
• “Views mergers as being planned 
and executed to achieve market 
power.  This cannot only occur in 
horizontal organizations 
(Risberg, p.10).” 
 Self-interest from the 
bidder 
• Amihud and Lev 
(1981) found 
evidence of 
managers engaging 
in mergers to 
decrease their 
employment risk 
o Further 
suggest that 
they are 
more likely 
to do this if 
ownership 
is diffuse 
• Lewellen, Loderer, 
and Rosenfeld 
(1989) consider 
that managers are 
motivated to merge 
to reduce the firm’s 
riskiness  
 
Synergies 
• Sum of the combined 
parts of both firms is 
greater than the 
individual 
components 
• In other words, 1 + 1 
= 3 
 Efficiency Theory 
• Mergers are “planned and 
executed to achieve synergies 
(Risberg, p.9).” 
• Financial, operational, 
managerial synergies 
• “In sum, the efficiency theory’s 
record is unfavourable. It appears 
to be consistent with stock 
market quotations but far less 
with companies’ actual 
performance. If one regards 
financial statements as more 
reliable than stock prices the 
efficiency theory has to be 
rejected. However, if one 
assumes the capital market to be 
efficient the theory can be 
held…(p.10).” 
 
 Financial synergy and 
diversification 
• Occurs when the 
market value of the 
merged firms has a 
greater market 
value of the 
separate firms. 
Operating synergy 
• Improvements in 
any business 
function, including 
management, 
labour costs, 
production or 
distribution, 
resource 
acquisition and 
allocation, or 
market power 
(Bradley, Desai, 
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Kim, 1983). 
 
 
Financial 
• Signalling that the 
target company is 
undervalued 
 Valuation Theory 
• “Mergers are planned and 
executed by managers who have 
better information about the 
target’s value than the stock 
market (Steiner, 1975; 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). 
Bidders’ managers may have 
unique information about 
possible advantages to be derived 
from combining the target’s 
businesses with their own. Or 
they may have detected an 
undervalued company that only 
waits to be sold in pieces (p.11).” 
 Bankruptcy 
Avoidance 
• Firm might agree to 
be acquired 
because it’s close 
to bankruptcy, and 
acquisitions avoid 
deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy 
(Haugen and 
Senbet 1978) 
• 15.2% of target 
firms in a sample 
by Shrieves and 
Stevens (1979) 
were close to 
insolvency 
 
Diversification 
• Reduce over-exposure 
on fewer areas by 
entering new lines of 
business 
 Empire-building Theory 
• In tune with agency theory, this 
suggests managers seek to 
“maximize their own utility 
instead of their shareholders’ 
value. This approach has its roots 
in the original study on the 
separation of ownership and 
control in the corporation (Berle 
and Means, 1933).” 
 
 Financial Slack 
• Pecking Order 
Hypothesis 
provides a motive 
for firms with large 
investment 
opportunities but 
low cash, to merge 
with a company 
with the opposite 
profile (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; 
Bruner, 1988; 
Hubbard and Palia, 
1999) 
 
  Process Theory 
• Mergers are the result of limited 
processing capabilities, 
organizational routines, and 
political games more than 
rationale decision-making  
• “Even less evidence relating to 
the process theory than to the 
empire-building theory. The 
scarcity of direct evidence can be 
seen as being caused by merger 
makers’ attempts to rationalize 
 Hubris 
• Proposed by Roll 
(1986) 
• Management 
overvalues their 
ability to create 
value once 
acquiring the target 
company’s assets 
• At the 
announcement of 
the acquisition, the 
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their actions (p.13).” 
 
overall change in 
the market values 
of the firms should 
be zero (or even 
negative, since the 
transaction is 
costly) 
• Evidence shows 
that valuation 
effects of 
acquisition 
announcements see 
target-firm 
shareholders 
receiving large 
positive ARs, while 
those for bidder 
firms are generally 
negligible (Roll, 
1986) 
 
  Disturbance Theory 
• Merger waves are “caused by 
economic disturbances (p.14).” 
• Not theoretically sound, because 
we see that previous waves are 
caused without economic 
disturbances, and also that 
disturbances don’t necessarily 
result in M&A waves 
 
  
  Raider Theory 
• Describing a manager “who 
causes wealth transfers from 
stockholders of the companies he 
bids for (p.14).” 
• This theory holds very 
unfavourable evidence- a study 
of 69 mergers initiated by some 
of the largest raiders show 
returns of 8-30% for target 
company shareholders 
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Appendix 3: Capital and Debt Priority Structure (Rauh & Sufi, 2010) 
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Appendix 4: Share Price Event Study Formulae 
 	  
 
Appendix 5: Share Price Event Study Timeline 
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Appendix 6: List of 
Competitors 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  List	  of	  Firms	  1-­‐31	  (in	  bold)	  with	  chosen	  Benchmark	  List	  
	   	   	   	   	  ABB	  Ltd	  
	  
Akzo	  Nobel	  NV	  
	  
Atlas	  Copco	  AB	  
	  
BASF	  SE	  
Schneider	  Electric	  SE	  
	  
	  	  	  Solvay	  SA	  
	  
Fanuc	  Corp	  
	  
	  	  Air	  Liquid	  SA	  
Atlas	  Copco	  AB	  
	  
	  	  	  Koninklijke	  DSM	  NV	  
	  
Konw	  Oyj	  
	  
	  	  Linde	  AG	  
Philips	  NV	  
	  
	  	  	  Sygenta	  AG	  
	  
Sandvik	  AB	  
	  
	  	  Sygenta	  AG	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Compass	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
CRH	  PLC	  
	  
Daimler	  AG	  
	  
Electricite	  De	  France	  SA	  
Sodexo	  SA	  
	  
Holcim	  Ltd	  
	  
Volkswagen	  AG	  
	  
Engie	  SA	  
Whitbread	  PLC	  
	  
Compagnie	  de	  SG	  SA	  
	  
Bayerische	  Motoren	  AG	  
	  
RWE	  AG	  
Accor	  SA	  
	  
Lafarge	  SA	  
	  
Renault	  SA	  
	  
Enel	  SpA	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Eni	  Spa	  
	  
FirstGroup	  PLC	  
	  
Fresenius	  Medical	  Care	  AG	   G4S	  PLC	  
Statoil	  ASA	  
	  
StageGroup	  PLC	  
	  
Fresenius	  SE	  
	  
Securitas	  AB	  
BG	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
Go-­‐Ahead	  PLC	  
	  
Smith	  PLC	  
	  
Hays	  PLC	  
Repsol	  SA	  
	  
National	  Express	  PLC	  
	  
Sonova	  AG	  
	  
Serco	  PLC	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  GlaxoSmithKline	  PLC	  
	  
Norilskii	  Nikel	  OAO	  
	  
Henkel	  AG	  &	  Co.	  KGAA	  
	  
Koninklijke	  KPN	  NV	  
Bayer	  AG	  
	  
Severstal	  PAO	  
	  
Reckitt	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
Belgacom	  NV	  
Novo	  AS	  
	  
Eyraz	  PLC	  
	  
Colgate-­‐Palmolive	  
	  
Swisscom	  AG	  
Sanofi	  SA	  
	  
Novolipetsk	  OAO	  
	  
Kimberly-­‐Clark	  
	  
Telefonica	  SA	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Philips	  NV	  
	  
National	  Grid	  PLC	  
	  
Nestle	  SA	  
	  
NOVOLIPETSKII	  	  OAO	  
Abb	  Ltd	  
	  
SSE	  PLC	  
	  
Unilever	  NV	  
	  
	  	  Severstal	  PAO	  
Schneider	  Electric	  SE	  
	  
Centrica	  PLC	  
	  
L'Oreal	  
	  
	  	  Evraz	  plc	  
Legrand	  SA	  
	  
RWE	  AG	  
	  
Danone	  
	  
	  	  Polyus	  Gold	  Int	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  NORSK	  HYDRO	  ASA	  
	  
SCHNEIDER	  ELECTRIC	  SA	   SMITHS	  GROUP	  PLC	  
	  
SOLVAY	  SA	  
	  	  	  Boliden	  AB	  
	  
	  	  	  ABB	  Ltd	  
	  
	  	  Weir	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  Akzo	  NV	  
	  	  	  Antofagasta	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  	  Philips	  NV	  
	  
	  	  IMI	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  DSM	  NV	  
	  	  	  Rio	  Tinto	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  	  Legrand	  SA	  
	  
	  	  Spectrics	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  Syngenta	  AG	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  STATOIL	  ASA	  
	  
STORA	  ENSO	  OYJ	  
	  
LM	  ERICSSON	  
	  
VINCI	  SA	  
	  	  	  Eni	  SpA	  
	  
	  	  UPM-­‐Kymmene	  Oyj	  
	  
	  	  Alcatel	  SA	  
	  
	  	  Compagnie	  de	  SG	  SA	  
	  	  	  BG	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  Smurfit	  Kappa	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  Nokia	  Oyj	  
	  
	  	  Eiffage	  SA	  
	  	  	  Repsol	  SA	  
	  
	  	  Svenska	  Cellulosa	  AB	   	  	  Motorola	  Inc	  
	  
	  	  Hochtief	  AG	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  VODAFONE	  GROUP	  PLC	  
	  
VOLVO	  AB	  
	  
WHITBREAD	  PLC	  
	   	  	  	  	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  
	  
	  	  	  Paccar	  Inc	  
	  
	  	  InterContinental	  Hotels	  
	   	  
250	  days	  estimation	  window	   60	  days	  from	  M&A	  announcement	  	  
11-­‐day	  event	  window	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  Telefonica	  SA	  
	  
	  	  	  Man	  SE	  
	  
	  	  Accor	  SA	  
	   	  	  	  	  BT	  Group	  PLC	  
	  
	  	  	  Scania	  AB	  
	  
	  	  Sodexo	  SA	  
	   	   
Appendix 7: Data Collection 
Name Industry 
Credit 
Change From To Agency 
Credit 
Announcement 
Time 
Btw 
M&A 
and 
Credit 
Change 
ABB	  LTD	   Electrical	  Equipment	   Downgrade	   A	   A-­‐	   Fitch	   03/06/2011	   Nil	  
AKZO	  NOBEL	  NV	   Chemicals	   Downgrade	   A-­‐	   BBB+	   S&P	   25/02/2009	   1	  m	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	  AB	  
Industrial	  
Equipment	   Upgrade	   A-­‐	   A	   S&P	   24/02/2011	   Nil	  
BASF	  SE	   Chemicals	   Upgrade	   B	   A+	   Fitch	   13/12/2010	   1	  m	  
COMPASS	  GROUP	  PLC	   Support	  Service	   Upgrade	   BBB+	   A-­‐	   S&P	   26/07/2012	   1	  m	  
CRH	  PLC	   Building	  Materials	   Downgrade	   BBB+	   BBB	   Fitch	   05/10/2010	   2	  ms	  
DAIMLER	  AG	   Automotive	   Upgrade	   BBB+	   A-­‐	   Fitch	   10/06/2011	   2	  ms	  
ELECTRICITE	  DE	  FRANCE	  SA	   Electric	  Utility	   Downgrade	   AA-­‐	   A+	   S&P	   17/01/2012	   Nil	  
ENI	  SPA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Downgrade	   A2	   A3	   Moody´s	   16/07/2012	   Nil	  
FIRSTGROUP	  PLC	   Trasportation	   Downgrade	   BBB	   BBB-­‐	   S&P	   23/04/2007	   Nil	  
FRESENIUS	  MEDICAL	  CARE	  
AG	   Health	  Care	   Downgrade	   Ba1	   Ba2	   Moody´s	   30/05/2005	   2	  ms	  
G4S	  PLC	   Security	   Downgrade	   BBB	   BBB-­‐	   S&P	   05/11/2012	   1	  m	  
GLAXOSMITHKLINE	  PLC	   Pharmaceutical	   Downgrade	   AA-­‐	   A+	   Fitch	   21/04/2009	   Nil	  
KOMPANIYA	  NORILSKII	  
NIKEL	  OAO	  
Intensive	  
Manufacturing	   Upgrade	   BB+	   BBB-­‐	   S&P	   08/08/2006	   1	  m	  
HENKEL	  AG	  &	  CO.	  KGAA	   Personal	  Care	   Upgrade	   A-­‐	   A	   Fitch	   03/06/2011	   2	  ms	  
KONINKLIJKE	  KPN	  NV	   Telecomunication	   Downgrade	   BBB	   BBB-­‐	   Fitch	   17/12/2012	   2	  ms	  
KONINKLIJKE	  PHILIPS	  NV	   Electronics	   Upgrade	   A-­‐	   A	   Fitch	   26/10/2010	   2	  ms	  
NATIONAL	  GRID	  PLC	   Utilities	   Downgrade	   A	   A-­‐	   S&P	   24/08/2007	   1	  m	  
NESTLE	  SA	   Food	   Downgrade	   AAA	   AA+	   S&P	   16/08/2007	   1	  m	  
NOVOLIPETSKII	  KOMBINAT	  
OAO	  
Intensive	  
Manufacturing	   Upgrade	   BB+	   BBB-­‐	   Fitch	   19/05/2011	   Nil	  
NORSK	  HYDRO	  ASA	   Metals	   Upgrade	   BBB-­‐	   BBB	   S&P	   19/11/2010	   Nil	  
SCHNEIDER	  ELECTRIC	  SA	   Electrical	  Equipment	   Upgrade	   BBB-­‐	   A-­‐	   S&P	   26/11/2008	   2	  ms	  
SMITHS	  GROUP	  PLC	   Engineering	   Downgrade	   A-­‐	   BBB+	   S&P	   15/01/2007	   1	  m	  
SOLVAY	  SA	   Chemicals	   Downgrade	   A-­‐	   BBB+	   S&P	   07/09/2011	   Nil	  
STATOIL	  ASA	   Oil	  Stations	   Upgrade	   A+	   AA-­‐	   S&P	   03/08/2007	   Nil	  
STORA	  ENSO	  OYJ	   Packaging	   Downgrade	   BB+	   BB	   S&P	   14/05/2009	   1	  m	  
LM	  ERICSSON	   Telecommunication	   Upgrade	   BBB-­‐	   BBB+	   S&P	   15/06/2007	   1	  m	  
VINCI	  SA	   Construction	   Upgrade	   BBB	   BBB+	   Fitch	   26/02/2004	   1	  m	  
VODAFONE	  GROUP	  PLC	   Telecommunication	   Downgrade	   A+	   A-­‐	   S&P	   30/05/2006	   Nil	  
VOLVO	  AB	   Heavy	  Equipment	   Upgrade	   BBB-­‐	   BBB	   S&P	   15/04/2011	   Nil	  
WHITBREAD	  PLC	   Leisure	   Downgrade	   BBB+	   BBB	   Fitch	   27/07/2004	   1	  m	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Appendix 8: Average CAR in 11-day event window (Separate Indices) 
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